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In this paper we revisit the many studies that have attempted to explain the determinants of 
commercial real estate capitalization rates. We introduce two new innovations. First we are able 
to incorporate two macroeconomic factors that greatly impact cap rates besides treasury rates and 
local market fundamentals – the variables most commonly used in such research. These are the 
general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the amount of debt relative to GDP 
in the general economy (liquidity).  The addition of these factors greatly adds to the ability of 
previous models to explain the secular fall of cap rates in the last decade and their recent rise – in 
terms of traditional measures of within-sample fit.  
Our second innovation is methodological; our analysis uses a large and robust quarterly 
panel data set of 30 US metropolitan areas from 1980q1 through 2009q3. With this data we 
compare 3 models: a “base model and then one that selectively adds each of our macro-economic 
variables. We test the ability of each of these models to fit the 2002-2009 period using “back test” 
dynamic forecasts. Our conclusion is that much of the secular decline in cap rates from 2000 
through 2007 and their subsequent rise seem attributable to the macro-economic factors and less 
to movements in market fundamentals.   
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I. Introduction 
        In this paper we revisit many studies that have attempted to explain the determinants 
of real estate capitalization rates.1 We introduce several new innovations. First we are able to 
show that macroeconomic factors greatly impact cap rates besides risk-free government treasury 
rates. These are the general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the amount of 
debt (liquidity) issued in the economy. The addition of these factors greatly adds to the ability of 
previous models to explain the rise of cap rates in the early 1990s, the secular fall of cap rates in 
the last decade, and the recent rise during the “financial crisis”. 
Methodologically, our analysis uses a large and robust quarterly panel data set of 30 US 
metropolitan areas from 1980q1 through 2009q3. We compare models not only using traditional 
measures of within sample “fit”, but also examine how the models behave in in-sample “back 
test” forecasts. Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on 
cap rates. Next, we detail our panel data base and outline the basic econometric model that is 
used, and then present our results from this basic model as well as results from extended models, 
which introduce additional macroeconomic variables. We then compare the ability of the three 
models to explain changes in cap rates over the last 3 decades, using traditional measures of “fit”, 
and examine their relative performance using within-sample back test forecasts. The discussion 
and interpretation of our findings is offered in conclusion.  
 
 
II. Background and Literature 
The starting point of our paper is a long literature on the determinants of real estate 
capitalization rates. A number of studies have modeled cap rates as an adjustment around 
equilibrium values, which are in turn determined by real estate fundamentals such as rent levels 
and rental growth, as well as risk-free interest rates (see Sivitanides, Southard, Torto, and 
Wheaton [2001], Hendershott and MacGregor [2005a,b]; Chen et al [2004]; Chichernea et al. 
[2008] Sivitanidou and Sivitanides [1999], Shilling and Sing [2007]). Only one of these studies 
also includes any kind of metric representing a risk premium(see Archer and Ling [1997]). Our 
paper draws on this literature to specify what we term as our “Null” hypothesis - a standard, 
literature-based model with risk free rates and real estate fundamentals in determining 
capitalization rates. We specifically draw on Sivitanides, Southard, Torto, and Wheaton [2001] 
for this task.  A related line of inquiry asks about the “efficiency” of real estate pricing – in 
particular whether cap rates have the expected predictive power in explaining subsequent real 
estate returns (Hendershott and MacGregor [2005a,b], Ghysels, Plazzi, and Valkanov [2007]). 
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To this literature we more carefully add an impact of economy-wide risk premiums – 
assessing the impact of risk across property types. We also introduce the idea that the macro-
economic capital flows – in particular the availability of debt - may impact capital pricing. In the 
literature, there are theoretical models of asset pricing in which capital flows play an obvious role 
(for example Geltner et al [2007], Wheaton [1999]). Empirically, some recent work on real estate 
returns has begun to include the dynamics of commercial real estate capital flows (Ling and 
Naranjo [2003, 2006] as well as Fisher et al. [2007]). Concern over the obvious simultaneity 
between flows and returns has been raised over this line of research. Ling and Naranjo [2003, 
2006] find that capital flows into public (securitized) markets do not predict subsequent returns, 
while returns do impact subsequent capital flows. Other studies, however, find evidence that 
lagged institutional capital flows do have an effect on current returns at the aggregate level 
(Fisher et al. [2007]). In this study we avoid the simultaneity issue by using aggregate US capital 
flows rather than those directed at real estate. Furthermore, we do not consider equity, but only 
the availability and issuance of overall debt in the economy.  
In this regard we draw on a long macro-economic literature concerning the role of debt 
availability in generating asset demand and asset “bubbles” (Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Miller 
and Stiglitz [2008]). In recent years, these ideas have spawned a literature on what is termed 
“global imbalances” (see Caballero et al [2008]). This thesis postulates that due to the 
heterogeneity in countries’ ability to produce financial assets for domestic savers, large capital 
flows from developing countries to developed ones have tremendously increased debt availability 
and have bid up asset prices, including those of real estate. In this paper we specifically examine 
whether trends in the growth of overall debt in the US economy can help in explaining 
movements in real estate cap rates over the last decade.  
Our paper is most closely related to the recent work by Clayton, Ling, Naranjo [CLN, 
2009]. Our extensions of their paper are four. First, rather than use a 2-step error-correction 
specification to model cap rates we rely on the suggestion of Gallin [2006] and use a single-step 
adjustment model. Secondly, instead of relying on a short national time series, we gain immense 
degrees of freedom by working with a panel data base combining the time series of 30 US 
markets. Finally, we specifically examine the role of economy-wide debt availability. Particularly 
in the last decade, the widespread availability of debt and then the sudden contraction of this 
source of capital is often felt to be an important factor explaining the drop in cap rates from 2000-
2006 and then their sudden recent rise.  
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III.  Data and Historic Movements 
 
Like most other studies of US capitalization rates, we utilize the appraisal-based values 
reported since the early 1980s by the National Council of Real Estate Fiduciaries (NCREIF). 
NCREIF cap rates have often been criticized for not being based on actual sales transactions, but 
in the US they are the sole source of data going back several decades. Our data on rental rates 
comes from CBRE Econometric Advisors (formerly Torto Wheaton Research), and utilizes their 
rent indices created by applying hedonic analysis to data on thousands of actual lease transactions 
in each market.   
In Figure 1, we illustrate the two factors from our “Null” model that have previously been 
studied as influencing the NCREIF cap rate: the 10 year Treasury rate and the deflated (constant 
dollar) rent index for properties. We use the office market in New York as our example.  Like 
many US markets, office cap rates in that city moved between 6 and 10% over the last 2 decades, 
then declined sharply to 4% from 2002 to 2006, only to jump back to 7.5% in the last year. 
Against this we depict the real 10 year treasury rate and the real level of office rents. Over this 25 
year period, real interest rates steadily declined until the current financial crisis and visually there 
does seem to be some positive correlation with caps rates. Constant dollar rents vary almost 100% 
from index values of 0.7 to 1.3. When measured contemporaneously they seem on casual 
inspection to move inversely with cap rates – when rates are high rents are low. This affords some 
support for those studies arguing that markets inefficiently price current conditions and are not 
forward looking.  
In Figure 2 we introduce the first of our two macro-economic factors and plot the NY 
office capitalization rate alongside a general debt risk premium (spread). Here we use the 
Moody’s AAA yield versus the 10 year Treasury bond. On inspection, there seems to be a 
positive association, with the exception of 2001-2003 when close to record risk spreads are 
matched against a minor shift (if any) in cap rates.  
Finally, in Figure 3 we compare the cap rate with our measure of the growth in the debt as a 
fraction of GDP. Since 1980 the ratio of debt to GDP has increased by a factor of 2.3 – which 
amounts to an average yearly increase of about 4.6%. It is important to note that the debt 
measured here is gross debt and not final debt by households. If a household borrows from a bank 
that then borrows that money from (say) a securitized public market – the debt is counted twice. 
Similarly, firm borrowing can have many redundancies. Hence much of the growth in debt 
reflects an increase in financial intermediation. The question we ask then is whether increases in 
financial intermediation make it “easier to borrow” and whether this in turn impacts asset prices. 
If we were measuring asset prices in dollars there would of course be high simultaneity between 
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prices and borrowing. Loan demand surely increases with rises in asset prices. But here we are 
regressing growth in intermediation against cap rates to see if greater availability of debt and 
liquidity spur investors to “gamble” by paying more per dollar of current income. 
Historically, our index of the annual growth in debt/GDP shows three periods where 
financial intermediation grew rapidly: the mid 1980s, 1999-2002 and then 2005-2007. Financial 
intermediation stalled and took a step backwards in the early 1990s. Interestingly, the ratio of 
debt to GDP has not declined much in the current financial crisis because GDP has declined at the 
same time as firms and households have been deleveraging. The correlation here with cap rates is 
not so apparent, but in our multivariate analysis we will find in to be very strong.  
Using this data we estimate a separate model for each type of real estate (office, retail 
shopping centers, multifamily housing, and industrial). The macro-economic data is the same for 
each type of real estate – only the rent series and cap rates vary across property categories. For 
each model we use an unbalanced panel (they contain missing values for some observations) that 
spans the period from 1980 q1 to 2009 q3. Each panel has over 30 MSA markets and a statistical 
summary of the data set is found in the Appendix. As a result of missing values, the dataset for 
each property type contains from 1,920 to 3,175 usable observations, which generates high 
degrees of freedom. In terms of our estimation approach, all models in this paper are estimated 
using the fixed effects panel method (see Greene [2004]), with White’s heteroskedasticity 
correction for standard errors (White [1980]). 
The rationale behind this estimation strategy is compelling. The fixed effects panel 
technique allows us to use both time-series as well as cross-sectional (between MSA) variation, 
which increases the efficiency of the OLS estimators (see Greene [2004]). This generates better 
estimates of model coefficients. Furthermore, it explicitly models for the time-invariant 
differences (hence the name fixed effects) in trends between the cross-sectional MSA units. This 
framework is consistent with theoretical expectations that market-specific unobserved 
characteristics will lead to permanent differences in capitalization rate trends across markets, and 
the fixed effects method allows us to estimate the effect of these unobservables and test for their 
statistical significance. Finally, the higher estimator efficiency increases the power of post-
estimation tests, which allows for better inferences about results. Table 1 lists all variables used in 
this paper as well as their sources. The statistical summary for these variables is given in the 
Appendix. 
Among the right-hand-side variables, the Real Rent Ratio is the only one that exhibits full 
cross-sectional as well as time series variation. The national macroeconomic variables are of 
course the same for each cross-sectional unit. As such, this setup prevents us from including time 
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fixed effects in the models, since these would absorb the impact of the national macroeconomic 
variables. 
 
IV. The “Null” Specification: Market fundamentals and Treasury Rates.  
 
The first, most basic model intends to reflect the standard approach used in the literature to 
date (for reference see Sivitanides, Southard, Torto, and Wheaton [2001], from now on SSTW). 
This literature does not apply a 2-step error-correction process [see Gallen [2006]] and instead 
postulate that cap rates simply follow an adjustment process around equilibrium values. The 
equilibrium is estimated at the same time as the adjustment and is determined by two sets of 
influences: 1) the influences of a discount rate that reflects both the opportunity cost of capital 
and systematic market risk; (2) fundamental factors that shape investors’ income growth 
expectations. This is in keeping with the literature, which usually uses rental fundamentals and 
some proxy for interest rate to explain cap rates. 
As discussed above, the standard specification we use is given in (1). It is formulated so as 
to be comparable to more extended specifications used below. 
 
Log(Cj,t) = a0 + a1log(Cj,t-1) + a2log(Cj,t-2) + a3log(Cj,t-3)+a4log(Cj,t-4) + a5log(RRRj,t) + a6RTBt + 
 a7Q2t + a8Q3t + a9Q4t + a10Dj                              (1) 
 
In this panel specification j is Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and t is time. This is 
estimated separately for each property sector. The variables are as follows: 
Cj,t Capitalization rate from NCREIF database calculated from Net Operating Income 
and asset values. 
RRRj,t This is real rent ratio calculated as a ratio of real rent data from CBRE EA rent 
database for a given MSA in a given quarter to the historical average of real rent 
for this MSA: 
RRRj,t-s = Real Rentj,t/Mean(Real Rentj)        (1.1) 
 where the mean is calculated over sample time period for each j.  
RTBt Real T-Bond yield calculated as nominal yield minus inflation rate; this proxies 
risk-free rate and the opportunity cost of capital.  
Q2t, Q3t,, Q4t, Seasonal dummies to take out seasonality  
Dj Fixed market-level effects associated with each MSA 
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In terms of theoretical priors on the signs of coefficients, the risk free rate (RTB) is 
expected to have a positive effect on the cap rates. The effect of the real rent ratio RRR, on the 
other hand, is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether investors are forward or 
backward-looking. The real rent ratio is a stationary series with a strong tendency to mean revert 
(SSTW,[2001]). In case of forward-looking expectations, high rent levels (as compared to 
historical means) will inform investors that the market is at the peak of the cycle, and a downward 
adjustment is in order, causing them to expect lower cash flows in the future. If investors possess 
this paradigm, RRR will have a positive effect on capitalization rates. Alternatively, if investors 
are backward-looking (as evidenced by SSTW [2001]), investors will project current rent growth 
into the future and will bid up asset values accordingly. This mindset implies a negative effect of 
the rent ratio on cap rates. These expectations are in line with the long existing literature as 
discussed in the previous section. Finally, the MSA-level fixed effects (dummy variables) Dj 
account for non-varying market-specific characteristics not explicitly included in the model.  
Table 2 depicts estimation results for this basic model on our data set. The sum of the 
coefficients on lagged cap rates is around 0.8 indicating considerable momentum in the creation 
of appraisal cap rates. The real T-bond coefficient has the expected positive sign across property 
sectors and is statistically significant. The real rent ratio, the variable without an a priori sign 
expectation, has a statistically significant negative sign, which testifies to the backward-looking 
behavior of real estate investors, and is generally consistent with previous research. 
The group test for the collective effect of MSA dummies yields insignificant statistics for 
all property types but retail, while individual tests show that some MSAs are significant, while 
others are not. This is in line with findings in SSTW [2001], indicating that only some markets 
exhibit statistically significant differences in average cap rate levels. 
 
V. Extended Model Specification: Adding a Risk Premium.  
 
In this specification, we attempt to improve on the existing literature by including one new 
variable: the degree of general risk aversion in the economy (and hence the associated premium 
demanded by investors for this risk). We measure this with a standardized corporate bond spread. 
Specifically, we extend (1) with the following specification: 
 
Log(Cj,t) = a0 + a1log(Cj,t-1) + a2log(Cj,t-2) + a3log(Cj,t-3)+a4log(Cj,t-4) + a5log(RRRj,t) + a6RTBt + 
a7SPREADt +  a8Q2t + a9Q3t + a10Q4t + a11Dj                    (2) 
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The model setup is the same as in (1) with the addition of the SPREAD variable. Details are 
as follows: 
SPREADt Economy wide risk premium over the risk-free rate, calculated as the difference 
between Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond Index and the 10-year T-Bond. 
 
 
The expected coefficient signs for the variables carried over from (1) are the same as 
before. In terms of the new variables, SPREAD is expected to have a positive sign (with investors 
demanding compensation for higher risk in the form of lower asset values for the same NOI 
stream).  
The extended model is again estimated using fixed effects with White’s heteroskedasticity 
correction on the same unbalanced panel sample as the one used for standard model (1). Results 
of estimating the extended model (2) are given in Table 3. It is interesting that all coefficients 
have the expected signs and are significant across the four property types and that the addition of 
SPREAD has not changed the sign or significance of the original rental index and Treasury yield 
variables. This suggests this new factor is largely orthogonal to the original factors. In terms of 
point estimates, the sum of the coefficients on lagged cap rates is still around .8, but the 
coefficients on the rent ratio and real Treasury rate are increased. Finally, as was the case in the 
case of model (1), group tests on the collective significance of MSA fixed effects indicate group 
insignificance for all property types except multifamily. 
A comparison of estimation results of equation (1) and (2) show an improvement in the 
performance of the extended specification (2) vis-à-vis the standard version (1), across all 
property types. The extended model results in higher adjusted R squared statistics, and goodness 
of fit tests (discussed below in Table 5) and confirms the value of the additional variable. More 
importantly, however, the orthogonality and statistical significance of the risk spread variable 
indicates its importance in determination of capitalization rates. Clearly it should be included in 
future research on capitalization rates. This finding is in line with theoretical expectations that 
risk premium demanded by investors have strong effects on real estate asset pricing, and omitting 
these factors in cap rate models has been a major deficiency in most of the literature so far. 
 
VI. Extended Model Specification: Adding Debt Availability 
Our final and complete specification examines the possible importance of the availability of 
debt – as measured by the quarterly growth in overall economy wide ratio: Debt/GDP. Traditional 
financial economics implies that capital structure should not matter in an efficient market. 
Specifically, in equilibrium asset pricing theory, the amount of debt applied to an asset should not 
 9
impact its price, as risk increases commensurately. But as discussed above, recent economic 
thinking calls this into question.  Macro-economic theory now regards debt availability as a 
frequent cause of financial crises, and micro-economic theory argues that debt provides purchase 
liquidity.  Thus when debt is scarce, real estate transactions are more difficult, and prices may fall 
below their fundamental value. Easy debt encourages transactions and can increase asset prices 
above fundamental value – possibly into a “bubble”. Hence, we add a variable, which proxies for 
debt availability as is described below. 
 
Log(Cj,t) = a0 + a1log(Cj,t-1) + a2log(Cj,t-2) + a3log(Cj,t-3)+a4log(Cj,t-4) + a5log(RRRj,t) + a6RTBt + 
a7SPREADt + a8DEBAVAILt + a9Q2t + a10Q3t + a11Q4t + a12Dj                                     (3) 
 
DEBT_AVAILt Debt Availability as proxied by the annual growth rate in Total Debt 
Outstandingt/GDPt.  Both series are nominal numbers from the Federal Reserve’s 
Flow of Funds Database:   
 DEBT_AVAILt =  Year- on- Year Change in ( Total Debt Outstandingt/GDPt )  
 
The coefficient sign for DEBT_AVAIL is expected to have a positive effect on asset values 
as (and a negative effect on cap rates), as ceteris paribus investors will bid up asset values when 
it becomes easier to trade them. The test of this effect and its magnitude is especially relevant in 
the current environment where the general lack of debt financing is postulated to have an 
important negative influence on real estate asset prices.  
The extended model is again estimated using fixed effects with White’s heteroskedasticity 
correction on the same unbalanced panel sample as the one used for standard model (2). Results 
of estimating the extended model (3) are given in Table 4. It is interesting that all coefficients 
once more have the expected signs and are significant across the four property types. It is 
furthermore of note that the addition of DEBT_AVAIL has not changed the sign or significance of 
the original rental index, the real Treasury yield, or the risk premium variables. In fact, in Table 4 
the point estimates of the other two macro variables increases when the debt variable is included, 
suggesting again remarkable orthogonality. Finally, as was the case in the case of model (1), 
group tests on the collective significance of MSA fixed effects indicate group insignificance for 
all property types except multifamily. 
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VII. Comparison of Alternative Specifications: Goodness-of-Fit, Back-tests Forecasts  
Table 5 offers abbreviated goodness-of-fit results for all three specifications used in this 
paper used (equations (1), (2), and (3)) as well as Wald specification tests for the three equations. 
Specifically, the specification tests are implemented as Wald tests for exclusion restrictions on the 
additional variables (Greene [2004]). That is, we start with the most comprehensive model (3) 
and first test the null hypothesis that the coefficient a8 on the DEBT_AVAIL is equal to zero. Next, 
we test the joint exclusion restriction on the coefficients on all three variables that are not in 
specification (1)—DEBT_AVAIL and spread (i.e. this tests H0: a8 = a7 = 0). In this sense, 
equations (1) and (2) are nested with the comprehensive model (3) and the specification search 
can be conducted by testing these exclusion restrictions (Greene [2004]). 
As can be seen from Table 5, the progression of specifications from (1) to (2) and to (3) at 
each stage produces a statistically significant increase in explanatory power of the model. This is 
further confirmed by the goodness of fit statistics such as the adjusted R squared. This ranking 
testifies to the importance of such macro-economic financial factors in modeling capitalization 
rates. 
While the goodness-of-fit tests utilized above are an important indicator of the relative 
model performance, they are not always conclusive. Specifically, when lagged dependent 
variables are used, dynamic models customarily generate high measures of fit (and this is true in 
our case). It is often hard to judge between the various model specifications when they all exhibit 
such high measures of fit.  
A complimentary approach to judge the relative model performance is to construct a 
number of back-tests to ascertain the ability and effectiveness of each model to replicate the 
historical data. Such back-tests start at a point in the historical data and use the equation estimated 
on the full historical sample to dynamically forecast the dependent variable within a specified 
sample period. With this approach actual historical values for the model’s exogenous right-hand-
side variables are used, but any autoregressive terms (such as our lagged cap rates), use the 
previous period’s forecast. This is what distinguishes a dynamic in-sample forecast from the 
more common predicted values of the model used in R2 calculations. The result of this process 
allows the researcher to compare the in-sample forecast to actual historical observations and 
judge model performance. This method has an advantage over standard measures of fit in that it 
allows us to judge how well the different models can replicate historical data. The emphasis the 
back-tests we do here is on the ability of the various model specifications to replicate the strong 
decline in cap rates experienced across property types (often dubbed the cap rate compression) in 
the period from 2000-2009. 
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Figure 4 shows the back-test results for all 3 models used in this paper, with both 
performance statistics and the graphs of back-test forecasts. All back tests are performed against 
historical cap rates by using the model estimated on the entire sample to dynamically forecast 
capitalization rates from 2000q4 through the end of the sample in 2009q3 using historical data for 
the independent variables2. These dynamic forecasts are performed in a panel setting, which 
generates a cap rate forecast for each cross-sectional MSA unit. Next, these individual MSA 
forecasts are dynamically weighted by real estate stock in each market to produce a national 
weighted average forecast3. Finally, this weighted national forecast is used in conjunction with 
the historical weighted average cap rate (also dynamically weighted by stock3) to produce various 
forecast performance statistics reported for each model specification. These statistics, together 
with back-test plots, allow us to judge the relative success of the three models in explaining 
historical capitalization rates.  
In the first graph of Figure 4, the actual weighted average cap rate for office properties rises 
by 100bps from 2000q1 to 2002q2 and then declines steadily by almost exactly 400bps to 
2008q1. It then rises 200bps between then and 2009q2. With the “null” model there is no rise 
around the 9/11 recession, the total decline is less than 200bps. The recent rise is only 80bps.   On 
the other hand, the full extended model (with both risk premium and debt variables) has a slight 
30 bps rise, then a steady decline of 300 bps and very close to the actual 200bps recent increase. 
Examining the other plots shows that the null model does not do well at explaining the cap rate 
compression and sharp reversal over 2000-2009 - for all property types except possibly multi-
family housing. On the other hand, the full extended version of the model shows a marked 
improvement in explaining historical cap rates. The addition of the risk and debt variables makes 
a significant reduction in forecast error (over 2000q4-2009q3) using the various tests below each 
plot in Figure 4.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
We draw several conclusions from this research about the behavior of appraisal-based real 
estate prices during the last 30 years and in particular during the last 9 years. First, despite the fact 
that the rent fundamentals of the 30 markets studied here vary widely, local rent fundamentals are 
really just a small part of the explanation of cap rates. In fact, the test for collective significance 
of the cross-section fixed effects is not significant. We find it hard to imagine that relative rents 
are the only local variable that matters, and that there are no other systematic factors between 
markets.  
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Secondly, our three macro-economic variables (real Treasury rate, bond risk premium, and 
expansion of debt) matter enormously, despite the fact that they have no local variation and are 
simply a common factor across time for our 30 markets. Each of these factors individually is 
highly significant and collectively they drive the model. With commercial real estate the old 
adage that “all real estate is local” does not seem to be true – at least with this data.  
Finally, our results really do suggest a strong empirical relationship between asset prices and 
growth of debt within the economy. To address causality, the variable that we use is the ratio of 
total debt outstanding to GDP, and within this data, commercial real estate debt represents less 
than 6% of total current public and private debt. It is hard to argue that changes in commercial 
real estate prices are driving the entire debt structure of the economy. Still the very significant 
role of this variable only hints at the complex relationships that must exist between real estate 
prices and the availability of debt. What determines the amount of debt that investors want to put 
on property? Does the supply of debt and underwriting vary with the current position of the 
market? To what extent is debt rationed as opposed to being priced and why? Given the empirical 
relationship here, we need to return and reexamine the core theory of capital structure in real 
estate finance.  
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Endnotes: 
1. Real estate capitalization rates can be thought of as inverse Price/Earnings ratios.  
2. Back-test forecasts start in 2002q4 for multifamily due to some issues with the averaged 
national series for multifamily around 2000. 
3. The stock measure used in thousands of square feet in each market for the given property 
type. The weighting is dynamic in that for each time period t, that period’s stock series is 
used across the cross section to produce the national cap rate value for this period t 
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APPENDIX: Statistical Summary of Variables 
 
Note: since the time period differs between property type (except for office and industrial), the 
moments for national variables and the number of included observations differ as a result. 
 
Office 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std 
Error Minimum Maximum 
Log(CAP) 2814 2.012677 0.234099 0.686123 2.762589 
Log(Real Rent ratio) 5382 -0.033678 0.157157 -0.619435 0.855274 
Real T-Bond 5510 3.555497 1.797885 0.264329 9.100207 
Risk Spread 5662 1.022259 0.404341 0.013333 2.27333 
Debt Flow 5662 0.220033 0.058572 0.093652 0.352057 
 
Industrial 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std 
Error Minimum Maximum 
Log(CAP) 3175 2.064373 0.193181 1.122329 2.892148 
Log(Real Rent ratio) 5437 -0.02478 0.140474 -0.539366 0.555696 
Real T-Bond 5510 3.555497 1.797885 0.264329 9.100207 
Risk Spread 5662 1.022259 0.404341 0.013333 2.27333 
Debt Flow 5662 0.220033 0.058572 0.093652 0.352057 
 
Multifamily 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std 
Error Minimum Maximum 
Log(CAP) 1920 1.921208 0.235038 0.712165 2.554744 
Log(Real Rent ratio) 4099 0.003288 0.082049 -0.256498 0.319933 
Real T-Bond 4930 3.555497 1.797904 0.264329 9.100207 
Risk Spread 5066 1.022259 0.404345 0.013333 2.27333 
Debt Flow 5066 0.220033 0.058573 0.093652 0.352057 
 
Retail 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std 
Error Minimum Maximum 
Log(CAP) 2011 1.980214 0.215791 0.337044 2.796623 
Log(Real Rent ratio) 3798 -0.014735 0.142909 -0.749771 0.458475 
Real T-Bond 3834 3.563226 1.809565 0.264329 9.100207 
Risk Spread 3942 1.032945 0.399909 0.013333 2.27333 
Debt Flow 3942 0.221487 0.058235 0.093652 0.352057 
 
 
MSA's Used in the Panel 
Office Industrial Multifamily Retail 
Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta 
Austin Austin Austin Austin 
Baltimore Baltimore Baltimore Baltimore 
Boston Boston Boston Boston 
 17
Charlotte Charlotte Charlotte Chicago 
Chicago Chicago Chicago Columbus 
Columbus Cincinnati Cincinnati Dallas 
Dallas Columbus Dallas Denver 
Denver Dallas Denver Fort Lauderdale 
Detroit Denver Fort Lauderdale Houston 
Edison Edison Fort Worth Los Angeles 
Fort Lauderdale Fort Lauderdale Houston Miami 
Houston Fort Worth Kansas City Minneapolis 
Kansas City Houston Las Vegas New York 
Los Angeles Indianapolis Los Angeles Oakland 
Miami Kansas City Memphis Orange County 
Minneapolis Los Angeles Miami Orlando 
New York Memphis Minneapolis Philadelphia 
Newark Miami Nashville Phoenix 
Oakland Minneapolis New York Portland 
Orange County New York Orange County Sacramento 
Orlando Oakland Orlando San Diego 
Philadelphia Orange County Philadelphia San Francisco 
Phoenix Orlando Phoenix San Jose 
Pittsburgh Philadelphia Portland Seattle 
Portland Phoenix Raleigh Washington, DC 
Raleigh Portland Riverside West Palm Beach 
Sacramento Riverside Salt Lake City 
  
San Antonio Sacramento San Diego 
San Diego Salt Lake City Seattle 
San Francisco San Diego St. Louis 
San Jose San Francisco Tampa 
Seattle San Jose Washington, DC 
St. Louis Seattle West Palm Beach 
Stamford St. Louis 
  
Tampa Tampa 
Washington, DC Ventura 
West Palm Beach Washington, DC 
38 Markets 38 Markets 34 Markets 27 Markets 
 
 
Table 1 
Main Variables Used in Specifications 
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Variable Description Source 
Cj,t Capitalization rate from NCREIF database calculated from Net Operating Income and NCREIF portfolio 
values. 
National Council of Real 
Estate Investment 
Fiduciaries (NCREIF) 
RRRj,t Real rent ratio calculated as a ratio of real rent index from Torto Wheaton rent database for a given MSA in 
a given quarter to the historical average of real rent for this MSA: RRRj,t = Real Rentj,t/Mean(Real Rentj) 
where the mean is calculated over sample time period for each j.  
CBRE Torto Wheaton 
Research Rental Index. The 
index is hedonically derived 
and controls for quality 
RTBt Real T-Bond yield calculated as nominal yield minus inflation rate.  Federal Reserve 
SPREADt Risk premium calculated as the spread between Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond Index and the 10-year T-
Bond yield. 
Federal Reserve 
DEBT_AVAILt Debt Availability proxied by the annual growth rate in Total Debt Outstandingt/GDPt.  Both series are 
nominal numbers from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Database:   
 DEBT_AVAILt =  Year- on- Year Change in ( Total Debt Outstandingt/GDPt )  
Federal Reserve 
Table 2 
Multiple Regression Results 
Simple Literature-based Specification with Rents and T-Bond 
 
Independent Variable Office Industrial Multifamily Retail 
Constant 0.323  
(8.599) 
0.327 
(9.835) 
0.209 
(8.333) 
0.326 
(5.994) 
Log(CAP)t-1 0.484 
(9.568) 
0.442 
(16.286) 
0.574 
(18.879) 
0.365 
(7.034) 
Log(CAP)t-2 0.170 
(4.451) 
0.196 
(7.593) 
0.116 
(3.353) 
0.196 
(4.869) 
Log(CAP)t-3 0.064 
(1.829) 
0.058 
(2.406) 
0.122 
(2.860) 
0.143 
(3.296) 
Log(CAP)t-4 0.102 
(3.240) 
0.132 
(5.495) 
0.064 
(2.140) 
0.124 
(3.823) 
Log(Real Rent Ratio)t -0.062 
(-3.038) 
-0.059 
(-3.147) 
-0.135 
(-3.790) 
-0.117 
(-3.702) 
Real T-Bond 10year 0.014 
(6.267) 
0.009 
(5.754) 
0.020 
(10.411) 
0.010 
(4.181) 
Q2 0.002 
(0.261) 
-0.036 
(-0.905) 
-0.012 
(-2.189) 
0.007 
(-0.872) 
Q3 -0.035 
(-3.762) 
-0.011 
(-1.730) 
-0.021 
(-3.583) 
-0.021 
(-2.507) 
Q4 -0.036 
(-4.383) 
-0.020 
(-3.016) 
-0.006 
(-0.974) 
0.020 
(2.456) 
R-square (adjusted) 0.604 0.579 0.853 0.608 
Number of cross-sectional units 
(MSA markets) 
38 38 34 27 
Number of usable observations 
(excludes missing values) 
2902 3227 2001 2092 
Test of group significance of 
fixed effects 
F(37,*)=      0. 90508 
Significance Level: 
0.63447242 
F(37,*)=      0.59464 
Significance Level 
0.97598639 
F(33,*)=      0.53119 
Significance Level 
0.98742796 
F(26,*)=      1.13022 
Significance Level 
0.29383569 
Notes: The dependent variable is Log(Cap)t. The t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient values. Estimate of fixed effects omitted for brevity. All data is 
quarterly from 1980q1 through 2009q3 
 
Table 3 
Multiple Regression Results 
Extended Specification with the Risk Spread 
 
Independent Variable Office Industrial Multifamily Retail 
Constant 0.247 
(7.203) 
0.296 
(9.024) 
0.183 
(7.252) 
0.288 
(5.611) 
Log(CAP)t-1 0.457 
(9.500) 
0.433 
(15.907) 
0.562 
(18.523) 
0.332 
(6.524) 
Log(CAP)t-2 0.166 
(4.669) 
0.194 
(7.594) 
0.116 
(3.304) 
0.185 
(4.760) 
Log(CAP)t-3 0.070 
(2.069) 
0.059 
(2.456) 
0.116 
(2.885) 
0.147 
(3.461) 
Log(CAP)t-4 0.112 
(3.624) 
0.133 
(5.542) 
0.068 
(2.232) 
0.137 
(4.233) 
Log(Real Rent Ratio)t -0.106 
(-4.960) 
-0.067 
(-3.621) 
-0.168 
(-4.722) 
-0.138 
(-4.451) 
Real T-Bond 10year 0.022 
(9.042) 
0.012 
(7.431) 
0.022 
(11.474) 
0.017 
(6.408) 
Risk Spread 0.065 
(9.491) 
0.031 
(6.215) 
0.023 
(5.412) 
0.061 
(9.426) 
Q2 0.004 
(0.546) 
0.001 
(0.144) 
-0.011 
(-2.022) 
-0.005 
(-0.590) 
Q3 -0.033 
(-3.601) 
-0.010 
(-1.657) 
-0.021 
(-3.530) 
-0.021 
(-2.486) 
Q4 -0.039 
(-4.851) 
-0.022 
(-3.250) 
-0.007 
(-1.171) 
0.017 
(2.044) 
R-square (adjusted) 0.617 0.584 0.855 0.623 
Number of cross-sectional units 
(MSA markets) 
38 38 34 27 
Number of usable observations 
(excludes missing values) 
2902 3227 2001 2092 
Test of group significance of 
fixed effects 
F(37,*)=      1.02112 
Significance Level: 
0.43342794 
F(37,*)=      0.62153 
Significance Level 
0.96524632 
F(33,*)=      0.64296 
Significance Level 
0.94366394 
F(26,*)=      1.32915 
Significance Level 
0.12154516 
Notes: The dependent variable is Log(Cap)t. The t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient values. Estimate of fixed effects omitted for brevity. All data is 
quarterly from 1980q1 through 2009q3 
 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression Results 
Full Specification with Risk Spreads and Debt Availability 
 
Independent Variable Office Industrial Multifamily Retail 
Constant 0.348 
(9.419) 
0.381 
(10.448) 
0.296 
(10.403) 
0.344 
(6.866) 
Log(CAP)t-1 0.430 
(9.272) 
0.418 
(15.429) 
0.521 
(17.338) 
0.318 
(6.222) 
Log(CAP)t-2 0.154 
(4.507) 
0.185 
(7.243) 
0.102 
(3.064) 
0.177 
(4.507) 
Log(CAP)t-3 0.065 
(1.958) 
0.051 
(2.158) 
0.117 
(3.109) 
0.144 
(3.312) 
Log(CAP)t-4 0.113 
(3.728) 
0.126 
(5.265) 
0.071 
(2.433) 
0.139 
(4.306) 
Log(Real Rent Ratio)t -0.070 
(-3.420) 
-0.045 
(-2.451) 
-0.140 
(-4.092) 
-0.089 
(-2.967) 
Real T-Bond 10year 0.023 
(9.735) 
0.014 
(8.498) 
0.021 
(11.455) 
0.018 
(6.960) 
Risk Spread 0.088 
(11.933) 
0.047 
(8.729) 
0.046 
(9.887) 
0.077 
(11.286) 
Debt Availability -1.575 
(-8.911) 
-0.931 
(-6.400) 
-1.653 
(-10.128) 
-1.064 
(-5.305) 
Q2 0.005 
(0.664) 
0.001  
(0.145) 
-0.009 
(-1.813) 
-0.004 
(-0.544) 
Q3 -0.033 
(-3.733) 
-0.011 
(-1.806) 
-0.022 
(-3.907) 
-0.022 
(-2.611) 
Q4 -0.041 
(-5.224) 
-0.023 
(-3.466) 
-0.010 
(-1.657) 
0.015 
(1.799) 
R-square (adjusted) 0.629 0.590 0.863 0.630 
Number of cross-sectional units 
(MSA markets) 
38 38 34 27 
Number of usable observations 
(excludes missing values) 
2902 3227 2001 2092 
Test of group significance of 
fixed effects 
F(37,*)=      1.23936 
Significance Level: 
0.15070758 
F(37,*)=      0.77803 
Significance Level 
0.83073289 
F(33,*)=      0.98992 
Significance Level 
0.48357607 
F(26,*)=      1.11011 
Significance Level 
0.31735430 
Notes: The dependent variable is Log(Cap)t. The t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient values. Estimate of fixed effects omitted for brevity. All data is 
quarterly from 1980q1 through 2009q3 
 
Table 5 
Goodness-of-fit Statistics and Specification Tests 
 
 
 Office Industrial Multifamily Retail 
Standard Rents and T-Bond Model 
Adjusted R2 0.604 0.579 0.853 0.608 
Sum of Squared Residuals 67.535 53.054 16.769 37.676 
Log Likelihood 1338.729 2049.337 1944.970 1233.216 
Akaike Information Criterion -3.72811 -4.07887 -4.73890 -3.98244 
Swartz Information Criterion -3.63137 -3.99032 -4.61853 -3.88529 
Extended with Risk Spread 
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.584 0.855 0.623 
Sum of Squared Residuals 65.223 52.449 16.536 36.225 
Log Likelihood 1389.289 2067.856 1958.953 1274.282 
Akaike Information Criterion -3.76227 -4.08972 -4.75187 -4.02075 
Swartz Information Criterion -3.66347 -3.99930 -4.62870 -3.92089 
Full Specification with Risk Spread and Debt Availability 
Adjusted R2 0.629 0.590 0.863 0.630 
Sum of Squared Residuals 63.117 51.588 15.699 35.543 
Log Likelihood 1436.902 2094.547 2010.966 1294.170 
Akaike Information Criterion -3.79439 -4.10565 -4.80286 -4.03880 
Swartz Information Criterion -3.69353 -4.01334 -4.67689 -3.93625 
Specification Tests 
H0: coefficients on spread, debt_avail 
jointly = 0 
Chi-Squared(2)=    
156.242455 or 
F(2,*)=     78.12123 
with Significance 
Level 0.00000000 
Reject H0 
Chi-Squared(2)=    
86.080019 or F(2,*)=     
43.04001 with 
Significance Level 
0.00000000 
Reject H0 
Chi-Squared(2)=    
136.943656 or 
F(2,*)=     68.47183 
with Significance 
Level 0.00000000 
Reject H0 
Chi-Squared(2)=    
128.350891 or 
F(2,*)=     64.17545 
with Significance 
Level 0.00000000 
Reject H0 
H0: coefficient on debt_avail = 0 Chi-Squared(1) = 
79.404697 with 
Significance Level 
0.00000000 
Reject H0 
Chi-Squared(1)=     
40.963133 with 
Significance Level 
0.00000000 
Reject H0 
Chi-Squared(1)=    
102.575678 with 
Significance Level 
0.00000000 
Reject H0 
Chi-Squared(1)=      
28.147323 with 
Significance Level 
0.00000011 
Reject H0 
 
Figure 1 
NY Office Cap Rate and Model Variables 
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NY Office Cap Rate and Model Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
19
86
.
1
19
86
.
4
19
87
.
3
19
88
.
2
19
89
.
1
19
89
.
4
19
90
.
3
19
91
.
2
19
92
.
1
19
92
.
4
19
93
.
3
19
94
.
2
19
95
.
1
19
95
.
4
19
96
.
3
19
97
.
2
19
98
.
1
19
98
.
4
19
99
.
3
20
00
.
2
20
01
.
1
20
01
.
4
20
02
.
3
20
03
.
2
20
04
.
1
20
04
.
4
20
05
.
3
20
06
.
2
20
07
.
1
20
07
.
4
20
08
.
3
20
09
.
2
R
is
k 
Pr
e
m
iu
m
 
%
C
a
p 
R
a
te
, 
R
e
a
l B
o
n
d 
Yi
e
ld
 
%
NYC Office Cap Rate, Macro Risk Premium
Cap Rate Risk Premium (right)
Figure 3 
NY Office Cap Rate and Model Variables 
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Figure 4 
Back-Testing Model Specifications 
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Back-Testing Models: Office
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Forecast Performance: Office 
Model 
Mean Error of 
Forecast 
Mean Absolute Error 
of Forecast RMS Error 
Standard Rents and T-Bond 0.141923472 0.822825128 0.928674129 
Extended: Risk Spreads -0.097916628 0.405762272 0.48367437 
Full: Risk Spread and Debt Growth 0.086932869 0.294923269 0.371128848 
Based on 36 forecast steps from 2000q4 through 2009q3   
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Back-Testing Models: Industrial
2000q4 to 2009q3
Historical Cap Rate Standard Rents & T-Bond Extended w Spreads Full w Spreads and Debt
 
Forecast Performance: Industrial 
Model 
Mean Error of 
Forecast 
Mean Absolute Error 
of Forecast RMS Error 
Standard Rents and T-Bond -0.484320258 0.616390147 0.782933987 
Extended: Risk Spreads -0.621723828 0.621723828 0.705688893 
Full: Risk Spread and Debt Growth -0.429204775 0.429204775 0.492186386 
Based on 36 forecast steps from 2000q4 through 2009q3   
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Back-Testing Models: Multifamily
2002q4 to 2009q3
Historical Cap Rate Standard Rents & T-Bond Extended w Spreads Full w Spreads and Debt
 
Forecast Performance: Multifamily 
Model 
Mean Error 
of Forecast 
Mean Absolute Error of 
Forecast RMS Error 
Standard Rents and T-Bond 
-
0.390658921 0.438488021 0.508791942 
Extended: Risk Spreads 
-
0.332357839 0.355807289 0.40854791 
Full: Risk Spread and Debt Growth 
-
0.216759011 0.286913489 0.334277814 
Based on 28 forecast steps from 2002q4 through 2009q3   
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Back-Testing Models: Retail
2000q4 to 2009q43
Historical Cap Rate Standard Rents & T-Bond Extended w Spreads Full w Spreads and Debt
 
Forecast Performance: Retail 
Model 
Mean Error 
of Forecast 
Mean Absolute Error of 
Forecast RMS Error 
Standard Rents and T-Bond 0.081445658 0.618472864 0.704565798 
Extended: Risk Spreads 
-
0.104826436 0.289108592 0.33781894 
Full: Risk Spread and Debt Growth 0.023577708 0.218515364 0.261723851 
Based on 36 forecast steps from 2000q4 through 2009q3   
 
